<?xml version="1.0"?>
<dblpperson name="Ken Binmore" pid="86/909" n="12">
<person key="homepages/86/909" mdate="2009-06-09">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
</person>
<r><article key="journals/geb/Binmore11" mdate="2020-02-22">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<title>Commentary: Nash's work in economics.</title>
<pages>2-5</pages>
<year>2011</year>
<volume>71</volume>
<journal>Games Econ. Behav.</journal>
<number>1</number>
<ee>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.010</ee>
<url>db/journals/geb/geb71.html#Binmore11</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><book key="books/daglib/0019474" mdate="2011-03-23">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<title>Game theory - a very short introduction.</title>
<pages>1-184</pages>
<publisher>Clarendon Press</publisher>
<year>2007</year>
<isbn>978-0-19-921846-2</isbn>
</book>
</r>
<r><article key="journals/geb/BinmoreS06" mdate="2020-02-22">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<author pid="00/3274">Larry Samuelson</author>
<title>The evolution of focal points.</title>
<pages>21-42</pages>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>55</volume>
<journal>Games Econ. Behav.</journal>
<number>1</number>
<ee>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.005</ee>
<url>db/journals/geb/geb55.html#BinmoreS06</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><article key="journals/geb/BinmoreSY03" mdate="2020-02-22">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<author pid="00/3274">Larry Samuelson</author>
<author pid="22/4795">Peyton Young</author>
<title>Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.</title>
<pages>296-328</pages>
<year>2003</year>
<volume>45</volume>
<journal>Games Econ. Behav.</journal>
<number>2</number>
<ee>https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00146-5</ee>
<url>db/journals/geb/geb45.html#BinmoreSY03</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><article key="journals/jet/BinmoreMPSS02" mdate="2020-02-24">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<author pid="29/2676">John D. McCarthy</author>
<author orcid="0000-0003-1680-3580" pid="85/4844">Giovanni Ponti</author>
<author pid="00/3274">Larry Samuelson</author>
<author pid="60/11426">Avner Shaked</author>
<title>A Backward Induction Experiment.</title>
<pages>48-88</pages>
<year>2002</year>
<volume>104</volume>
<journal>J. Econ. Theory</journal>
<number>1</number>
<ee>https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2910</ee>
<url>db/journals/jet/jet104.html#BinmoreMPSS02</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><article key="journals/geb/BinmoreS01a" mdate="2020-02-22">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<author pid="00/3274">Larry Samuelson</author>
<title>Evolution and Mixed Strategies.</title>
<pages>200-226</pages>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>34</volume>
<journal>Games Econ. Behav.</journal>
<number>2</number>
<ee>https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0813</ee>
<url>db/journals/geb/geb34.html#BinmoreS01a</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><article key="journals/geb/BinmoreS01" mdate="2020-02-22">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<author pid="00/3274">Larry Samuelson</author>
<title>Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game.</title>
<pages>6-30</pages>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>35</volume>
<journal>Games Econ. Behav.</journal>
<number>1-2</number>
<ee>https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0749</ee>
<url>db/journals/geb/geb35.html#BinmoreS01</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><article key="journals/geb/Binmore01" mdate="2020-02-22">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<title>Creativity and Acclaim.</title>
<pages>9-10</pages>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>36</volume>
<journal>Games Econ. Behav.</journal>
<number>1</number>
<ee>https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0863</ee>
<url>db/journals/geb/geb36.html#Binmore01</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><book key="books/lib/Binmore98" mdate="2020-07-17">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<title>Just Playing.</title>
<publisher>MIT Press</publisher>
<year>1998</year>
<pages>I-XXIII, 1-589</pages>
<series>MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution</series>
<volume>2</volume>
<isbn>0262024446</isbn>
<ee>https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/39797839</ee>
</book>
</r>
<r><article key="journals/jasss/Axelrod98" mdate="2020-07-09">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<title>The Complexity of Cooperation <i>by Robert Axelrod</i>.</title>
<year>1998</year>
<volume>1</volume>
<journal>J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul.</journal>
<number>1</number>
<ee type="oa">http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/1/1/review1.html</ee>
<url>db/journals/jasss/jasss1.html#Axelrod98</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><article key="journals/ker/BinmoreCDW98" mdate="2026-02-25">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<author pid="96/1517">Cristiano Castelfranchi</author>
<author pid="144/8468">James Doran</author>
<author orcid="0000-0002-9329-8410" pid="w/MichaelWooldridge">Michael J. Wooldridge</author>
<title>Rationality in Multi-Agent Systems.</title>
<pages>309-314</pages>
<year>1998</year>
<volume>13</volume>
<journal>Knowl. Eng. Rev.</journal>
<number>3</number>
<ee>https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269888998003026</ee>
<url>db/journals/ker/ker13.html#BinmoreCDW98</url>
</article>
</r>
<r><inproceedings key="conf/tark/Binmore94" mdate="2002-03-05">
<author pid="86/909">Ken Binmore</author>
<title>Rationality in the Centipede.</title>
<pages>150-159</pages>
<year>1994</year>
<crossref>conf/tark/1994</crossref>
<booktitle>TARK</booktitle>
<url>db/conf/tark/tark1994.html#Binmore94</url>
</inproceedings>
</r>
<coauthors n="8" nc="2">
<co c="1"><na f="c/Castelfranchi:Cristiano" pid="96/1517">Cristiano Castelfranchi</na></co>
<co c="1"><na f="d/Doran:James" pid="144/8468">James Doran</na></co>
<co c="0"><na f="m/McCarthy:John_D=" pid="29/2676">John D. McCarthy</na></co>
<co c="0"><na f="p/Ponti:Giovanni" pid="85/4844">Giovanni Ponti</na></co>
<co c="0"><na f="s/Samuelson:Larry" pid="00/3274">Larry Samuelson</na></co>
<co c="0"><na f="s/Shaked:Avner" pid="60/11426">Avner Shaked</na></co>
<co c="1"><na f="w/Wooldridge:Michael_J=" pid="w/MichaelWooldridge">Michael J. Wooldridge</na></co>
<co c="0" n="2"><na f="y/Young:H=_Peyton" pid="22/4795">H. Peyton Young</na><na>Peyton Young</na></co>
</coauthors>
</dblpperson>

