Coppola Comment

  It's been evident for some years now that those selling risky crypto products to risk-averse investors like to have federal branding on their snake oil. Tether claimed to have 100% actual dollar backing for its stablecoin. Various exchanges and platforms claimed that customer deposits were FDIC insured. The New York Attorney General showed that Tether didn't have 100% dollar backing or anything like it. And now the FDIC has sent cease & desist orders to  FTX , Voyager and several other crypto companies , it has become dangerous even to mention FDIC insurance in marketing material.  But that doesn't meant they've given up on the quest for a credible claim to Federal backing. The new Holy Grail is gaining access to Federal Reserve funding without becoming a licensed bank. Accordingt to analysts at Barclays, Circle, the issuer of the USDC stablecoin widely regarded in crypto markets as a "safe" dollar equivalent, may have found a way:  This screenshot com

 Stablecoins aren't stable. So-called algorithmic stablecoins crash and burn when people behave in ways the algorithm didn't expect. And reserved stablecoins fall off their pegs - in either direction. A stablecoin that does not stay on its peg is unstable. Not one of the stablecoins currently in circulation lives up to its name.  Don't believe me? Well, here's the evidence. Exhibit 1, USDT since the end of April: Exhibit 2, USDC over the same time period: (charts from Coinmarketcap) Both coins de-pegged on 12th May. Neither has returned to par. Stable, they are not.  And no, USDC is not "more stable" than USDT. A stablecoin that can't hold its peg when everyone is piling into it is no more stable than one that can't hold its peg when everyone is selling it. Indeed, since stablecoins can be created without limit, there is arguably much less excuse for a stablecoin de-pegging on the upside. Stablecoin issuers can run out of reserves, but they can't r

The world is saving like crazy. Corporations are building up cash mountains that they can’t or won’t invest in expanding their businesses. Individuals are building up pensions and precautionary savings. Governments, especially in developing countries, are building up FX reserves. The “ savings glut ,” as former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke dubbed it, shows no signs of dissipating. It is sloshing around the world looking for a productive home. But there isn’t one - or at least, not one that offers the safety that fearful investors desperately crave. That, fundamentally, is what is driving down the returns on assets. It is also the primary cause of the wide US trade deficit. The President likes to think that the reason for the US’s persistent trade deficits is unfair trade practices and currency manipulation. And for some countries, these are undoubtedly contributing factors. But the biggest reason by far is the global dominance of the dollar, and above all, the pre-eminence of dollar

In a lecture presented at the 2011 IMF Annual Research Conference, Hyun Song Shin of Princeton University argued that the driver of the 2007-8 financial crisis was not a global saving glut so much as a global banking glut. He highlighted the role of the European banks in inflating the credit bubble that abruptly burst at the height of the crisis, causing a string of failures of banks and other financial institutions, and economic distress around the globe. European banks borrowed large amounts of US dollars through the money markets and invested them in US asset-backed securities via the US's shadow banking system. In effect, they acted as if they were US banks, but in Europe and therefore beyond the reach of US bank regulation. This diagram shows how it worked (the “border” is the residency border beyond which US bank regulation has no traction): But it is not the model itself so much as Shin's remarks about the role of European regulation after the introduction of the

This post was originally published on Pieria in December 2013. Since then, the idea that the long-term real equilibrium interest rate must be equal to or lower than the long-term sustainable growth rate has become much more mainstream. I am just amazed that anyone ever thought it could be otherwise. A long-term real interest rate persistently above the sustainable growth rate cannot possibly be an "equilibrium" rate. As I show in this piece, it can only be maintained through rising inequality. It is by definition ponzi and therefore unsustainable. Periodic financial crashes are inevitable in any system in which growth does not cover the interest on debt.  Three years ago, Nick Rowe produced this post describing a “weird world” – a world in which the equilibrium interest rate is at or below the long-term growth rate of the economy, rather than above it as we are used to. In such a world, bubbles are inevitably created as investors search for positive yield. This is al

The chart below comes from the Rockefeller Institute's report on Public Pension Funding Practices (h/t @Silver_Watchdog on Twitter) . It illustrates perfectly the point I have been trying to make for quite some time now. Pension funds are not taking on more risky investments because the risk premium has fallen, but because the risk-free rate has fallen: In fact, as the chart shows, the risk-free rate has been falling steadily for over thirty years.  This is not a post-crisis blip. It is a secular trend. Yet pension investors have not adjusted their expectations of returns as the risk-free rate has fallen. Rather than targeting a spread above the risk-free rate that reflects their risk appetite, they target an historic rate. The chart suggests that the rate they are targeting has not significantly changed since 1990. Thus the risk appetite of pension fund investors has increased. In similar vein, the Wall Street Journal mourns the passing of the 100% bond fund: Ther

In a new paper *, Michael Woodford has reimagined the famous “Schroedinger’s Cat” thought experiment. I suspect this is unintentional. But that’s what happens when, in an understandable quest for simplicity, you create binary decisions in a complex probability-based structure. Schroedinger imagined a cat locked in a box in which there is a phial of poison. The probability of the cat being dead when the box is opened is less than 100% (since some cats are tough). So if p is the probability of the cat being dead, 1-p is the probability of it being alive. The problem is that until the box is opened, we do not know if the cat is alive or dead. In Schroedinger’s universe of probabilities, the cat is both “alive” and “dead” until the box is opened, when one of the possible outcomes is crystallised. Now for “cat”, read assets. In Woodford’s model, when there is no crisis, the probability of asset collapse is zero. But if there is a crisis, the probability of an asset collapse is grea